**Rebuilding Trust: How Congress and the Pentagon Can Transform Acquisition Reform**
The year 2025 was marked as a significant milestone for defense acquisition reform, building on more than five decades of effort to modernize and streamline the procurement process. However, as the Federal News Network points out, the success of these reforms hinges not just on updated statutes or organizational tweaks, but on the relationship between the two entities driving these changes: Congress and the Pentagon.
For decades, communication between these two pillars of defense governance has been strained and inconsistent. Described as resembling an “extended family” that only interacts during high-stakes events like weddings or funerals, the interactions between Congress and the Defense Department are often infrequent, tense, and dominated by moments of crisis or blame. If acquisition reform is to achieve its goals—particularly in streamlining regulations and fostering flexibility—this dynamic must evolve.
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### **Estranged: Communication between the Pentagon and Congress**
The average American might be surprised to learn just how limited communication between Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) truly is. As a recent military legislative assistant for a member of the House Armed Services Committee, the author has observed that senior military and acquisition officials primarily engage Congress during two key scenarios: annual budget and posture hearings, or in the wake of major acquisition failures. These moments parallel “weddings and funerals”—high-pressure situations that rarely foster understanding or collaboration.
Congressional staff and members often leave these interactions frustrated by a perceived lack of visibility into acquisition decisions. Meanwhile, Pentagon officials feel judged and misunderstood, viewing criticism as being removed from the complexities of real-world constraints. The result is a cycle of mistrust and miscommunication that benefits neither institution.
While defense fellows and legislative liaisons provide ongoing connections between Congress and the Pentagon, these relationships tend to be individual rather than institutional. This limits their ability to build long-term trust among high-level decision-makers. Additionally, Congress relies on slow, cumbersome processes like formal letters, reports, and hearings to request information from the Pentagon—many of which go unanswered or underutilized due to a lack of modern tracking tools.
Both sides share responsibility for this dynamic. The Pentagon is often hesitant to share sensitive or pre-decisional information with Congress, while Congress occasionally leaks information that embarrasses the DoD. High-profile incidents, though not the norm, reinforce mistrust and make future communication even more rigid.
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### **Why Trimming Process Won’t Fix the Family in the Long Run**
The Pentagon and congressional defense authorizers did find common ground in 2025, agreeing on a series of acquisition reforms. These include eliminating the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), raising statutory thresholds to reduce reporting burdens, and streamlining hundreds of Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions. While these changes are necessary, they are not sufficient on their own.
Acquisition rules have accumulated over decades as each layer of government adds safeguards to mitigate risk. Simply trimming processes without addressing the underlying mistrust will lead to the same accumulation over time. Moreover, key Pentagon reforms have stalled due to a lack of trust with congressional appropriators, who control the purse strings. Without trust, flexibility cannot be granted.
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### **Building Consistent Communication**
The solution is not more letters, reports, or hearings—this only leads to more “weddings and funerals.” Instead, Congress and the Pentagon must invest in new paradigms for trust-building and communication that provide continuous visibility into acquisition activities and encourage regular interaction during normal operations.
One potential solution is a short-term Hill staffer exchange program, where Congressional staff with clearances could spend a week in a Pentagon acquisition office to better understand the constraints and decisions faced by the executive branch. Similarly, a larger number of military personnel and DoD civilians could participate in shorter exchanges to experience the congressional environment.
Additionally, Congress and the Pentagon should implement the recommendation of the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform Commission to establish “Classified and Unclassified Communication Enclaves” to improve information flow. Modern communication technologies, including APIs and artificial intelligence, can play a critical role in making these enclaves effective. For example, a live, updatable system could allow Congress to access unclassified budget information currently trapped in thousands of pages of PDFs, while an automated tracking system could prevent reports from disappearing into an “abyss.”
While structural and cultural differences between Congress and the Pentagon will always exist, the goal is not to eliminate them but to ensure both sides understand them. This would allow for clearer distinctions between conflicts driven by institutional incentives versus those rooted in bad faith or incompetence.
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### **FAQ**
**Q: Why is communication between Congress and the Pentagon so limited?**
A: Communication is often limited due to high-stakes interactions, infrequent engagements, and mistrust. Sensitive information, fear of leaks, and institutional differences exacerbate the problem.
**Q: What reforms were agreed upon in 2025?**
A: Reforms included eliminating the JCIDS system, raising statutory thresholds to reduce reporting requirements, and streamlining hundreds of Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions.
**Q: Why aren’t these reforms enough?**
A: Without trust, processes will continue to accumulate over time. Additionally, appropriators hold significant power over funding, and without their trust, flexibility cannot be granted.
**Q: What solutions are proposed to improve communication?**
A: Proposed solutions include short-term staff exchanges, establishing classified and unclassified communication enclaves, and leveraging modern communication technologies like APIs and AI.
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### **Conclusion**
The strained relationship between Congress and the Pentagon is not insurmountable, but transforming it will require concerted effort and a willingness to rebuild trust. By investing in continuous communication and transparency, these two institutions can create a more flexible and responsive acquisition process. The first step is acknowledging the problem—and someone, whether in Congress or the Pentagon, will have to make the first move.
*Robin Dickey is the director of policy and government affairs at Slingshot Aerospace. She previously served as a military legislative assistant for a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee and as a space policy analyst at the Aerospace Corporation.*
